

Air Crimes and Air Travel: Aviation in the Age of Terrorism

On October 10, 1933 a new, state-of-the-art Boeing 247 passenger airliner cruised serenely in the skies Chesterton, Indiana. The sleek new Boeing was revolutionizing air travel with its all-metal aluminum alloy construction, semimonocoque fuselage, internally-braced cantilevered wing and powered by two closely-cowled reliable air-cooled Pratt & Whitney Wasp engines driving variable-pitched propellers. The combination of these advanced features produced an airliner that could cruise at 160 miles per hour - 60 percent faster than the standard Ford 5-AT Tri-Motor, yet use 20 percent less power. Fast and efficient; it was the future - the first modern airliner.

On board were four passengers, one flight attendant, the captain and the first officer. The flight started in Newark and was headed to San Francisco. At 9 o'clock that evening, it was on its second leg having left Cleveland a few hours earlier headed towards its next destination, Chicago. Ever since the 247 entered service in the spring of 1933, United Air Lines had heard rumors that the aircraft was possibly weak in the tail. Despite several accidents, due to pilot error, the Boeing 247 was warmly welcomed by the traveling public who enjoyed the speed and comfort of the plush airliner which cut transcontinental flight time to only 19 hours.

Suddenly, a massive explosion tore off the tail, plunging the crippled airliner to ground. All passengers and crew were lost in the fiery wreckage. At that time, the science of accident investigation was in its infancy. Little was known, but the head of the FBI's Chicago office, Melvin Purvis and his team of investigators realized that this accident was different: the rest room and aft baggage compartment had been shredded from within and the tail of the aircraft violently severed, intact, from the fuselage. According to Purvis, "everything in the front compartment was blown forward, everything behind blown backward, and things at the side outward."¹ The fuel tanks were crushed proving that they had not exploded. Other investigators from the local county coroner's office and the Crime Detection Laboratory at Northwestern University found evidence of nitroglycerine leading to the reasoned conclusion that a bomb had destroyed the aircraft. Despite a massive investigation, the case remains unsolved today. What is known is that a bomb was placed on board, and a criminal assassination from the Chicago underworld suspected. What is also known is that, unwittingly, Alice Scribner became the first female flight attendant to die in the line of duty.² This tragedy was the first documented case of an aerial crime in the United States. Sadly, it was not the last.

Since that evening, aviation, particularly commercial aviation, has been the target of criminals, violent political activists, the mentally unbalanced, thrill seekers, and the desperate. When aviation pioneers envisioned national and international networks of interlinked air routes bringing people together, none envisioned that the very tools designed to bring the world closely together through travel and commerce, could be turned against the very societies that created them. Aircraft, the very symbol of western modernity and technical achievement, have been used as weapons against western society and, because of its prominent visibility makes it a very tempting target for those dark-minded individuals seeking publicity or to promote their causes in some nefarious way.

Fortunately, for many years after the Chesterton bomb, air travel remained safe from crime. By the mid 1950s, when airlines superseded the railroads as the preferred method of long distance travel, criminals rediscovered the airliner as a target.

On November 1, 1955, another United Air Lines airliner was crossing the country. United Flight 629 left New York for Seattle. After stopping in Denver, Colorado, the Douglas DC-6B, ironically named Mainliner Denver, took-off from Stapleton Airport and headed northwest. Eleven minute later, tower controllers at Stapleton witnessed two bright lights fall to

earth followed by a bright flash. It was soon realized that flight 629 had crashed near Longmont, Colorado, killing all 44 persons on board. Initially, investigators suspected pilot error or an aircraft malfunction. Indeed, the first version of the DC-6 had been grounded following several inflight explosions caused by a poorly designed fuel tank. This was not the case.

An FBI investigation revealed that a powerful dynamite bomb had been placed in the luggage. Further investigation revealed that a passenger had unwittingly packed the bomb in her suitcase thinking it a present from her murderous son who sought to collect from his recently purchased flight insurance. He was quickly discovered, arrested, and convicted.³ On November 16, 1959 a National Air Lines Douglas DC-7C was lost over the Gulf of Mexico. A bombing was suspected but proved. January 6, 1960, a National Air Lines DC-6B was destroyed by a bomb over North Carolina. Forensic evidence indicated that bomb was placed under a passenger's seat. In both cases most of the evidence led to the belief that the aircraft were destroyed as part of insurance fraud, although neither could be satisfactorily proven.

Continental Flight 11, a Boeing 707 was a different story. It was blown apart over Unionville, Missouri on the evening of May 22, 1962. It was quickly learned that one passenger had recently been arrested for armed robbery and was soon to face

trial. He had taken out \$300,000 in life insurance and killed himself and all aboard so his family could collect.⁴

Crimes such as this were rare but prominent in the public mind through movies and television which often repeated similar stories of bombing for insurance money. Air crimes committed for money continued throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s with ever decreasing success. The one possible exception is that of the mysterious "D.B. Cooper," who hijacked a Northwest Airlines Boeing 727 from Seattle to Portland, Oregon, on November 24, 1971. Threatening a flight attendant with a bomb, Cooper (whose name is still not known) demanded a \$200,000 extortion and four parachutes. The airline complied so Cooper returned to Seattle, released all of the passengers and cabin crew except one flight attendant, seized the money and parachutes, and took off again with only the flight crew. Flying at 10,000 feet at only 120 miles per hour, the 727 headed east towards Reno, Nevada, when Cooper apparently depressurized the aircraft and jumped with his money into the darkness. He was never found. Several years later, a packet of money was recovered in a river, but no sign of Cooper was located. The case remains open and "D.B. Cooper" has entered popular lore.⁵

During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s many other hijackings took place but received little attention from law enforcement because of a lack of criminal intent. A series of

aircraft were seized in flight during this most dangerous period of the Cold War by persons attempting to flee communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While aircraft were taken at gunpoint or by threat of a bomb, the perpetrators were viewed as heroic figures attempting to escape to freedom and were welcomed as such. Indeed, their motivation was neither greed nor revenge - simply transportation to escape their predicament. In March 1950, three Czechoslovakian Douglas DC-3s were hijacked to a U.S. Air Force base in West Germany. Of the 85 passengers, 25 chose to stay. Six years later during the Hungarian Revolution, seven students seized an aircraft and landed safely in the West. Other attempts including a failed hijacking in Brazil and a hijacking to spread anti-government leaflets from the air in Lisbon also failed to elicit safety concerns.

With the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista coming unraveled in 1958 in the face of Fidel Castro's revolutionaries, several Cuban airliners and civilian aircraft were commandeered and flown to the United States. On another occasion, a Cubana Vickers Viscount was seized in flight by revolutionaries while on a flight from Miami to Havana in order to deliver weapons to Raul Castro. The effort failed when the airliner ran out of fuel, killing most of the passengers in the ensuing crash.

The complacency regarding political hijackings changed in America on May Day 1961 when Antulio Ramirez Ortiz takes control

of a National Airlines flight out of Miami and flies it to Cuba. This is the first recorded hijacking of a U.S. airliner. The reaction from the American public was swift and incredulous. It was discovered that no law existed stating that aerial hijacking was a crime.⁶ Within four months Congress passed Public Law 87-197 making "air piracy" a federal capital crime. The law further clarified that any other crimes committed while onboard and airliner would also be considered a federal offense. Section 902 of the Federal Aviation Act set the foundations for hijacking legislation in the U.S. making air piracy illegal, making the interference with the flight crew or cabin crew illegal, and prohibiting the carrying of a concealed deadly weapon. The punishment was severe with a minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum sentence of death.⁷

These steps were hoped to stop hijackings, but failed. At that time, despite strongly worded legislation, there was no other deterrent. Airports had virtually no security other than patrolling police officers - just like any railroad station or bus depot. And then the madness began.

Between 1958 and 1969, 177 hijackings took place around the world; of that number, 80 percent occurred in the western hemisphere with 77 percent of them flying to Cuba.⁸ Through the mid 1960s there were intermittent attempts, but after 1968, the

floodgates opened. Suddenly, U.S. airliners were getting hijacked at the astonishing rate of one every 70 hours in 1969.

This surge began in 1968 and coinciding with the political chaos caused by the Tet Offensive in Viet Nam and the rapidly growing domestic social unrest. Every flight was widely covered in the media and jokes circulated widely about being "taken to Havana." Between 1968 and 1972, 124 hijackings were attempted which greatly affected the traveling public and embarrassed the U.S. government.⁹ Most of the hijackers were petty criminals attempting to escape prosecution or mentally unbalanced individuals reacting to their own demons. Few hijackers were serious about seeking asylum, many more were copycat criminals seeking publicity.

All of the hijackings were uneventful and followed a predictable pattern of a threat, with orders to fly to Havana. The flight crew were instructed by their airlines to comply with the hijacker's demands and in turn, the hijackers normally released the passengers and crew upon arrival in Cuba with no drama. Normally the aircraft, passengers, and crew were returned within one or two weeks.¹⁰

For a while Cuba basked in the glow of this virtual flood of Americans seeking to escape the U.S. Over time, hijackers learned that the Cuban government no longer welcomed their arrival and began incarcerating them.

By 1973, "Going south," as the airline pilots called it, came to a sudden halt.¹¹ Why? Deterrence. In the years following the federal anti-hijacking legislation in 1961, the public demanded increased security. Proposals were made but rejected by the pilot's to arm flight crews. Instead, ALPA, an influential pilot's union, urged the screening of passengers and frisking for weapons. These effort were also rejected in the face of public opposition. In 1964, airlines were ordered by the FAA to lock the cockpit doors while in flight. While well-intentioned, this had little effect as the doors were thin and the flight crew instructed to accede to a hijackers demands in order to avoid a confrontation.¹² Furthermore, in July 1968, the State Department offered free rides to Cuba to any Cuban refugee wishing to go home. This too had little effect.

The first concrete deterrent took effect in 1969 when the FAA authorized the physical inspection of passengers suspected by the airlines to be a threat. Of dubious constitutionality, the measure was less than successful but marked the first serious security measure taken and the first significant approved security step that impinged on the civil rights of passengers.

In 1970, Congress created the "Sky Marshal" program which placed armed federal officers on selected flights in the hope of deterring a hijacking. While not particularly effective, by 1971

most of the marshals were reassigned to airport security screening details. By this time, however, the Lockheed Corporation had developed a magnetometer of sufficient power and accuracy to detect a firearm as it scanned passengers. Armed with this new technology, electronic screening became widely accepted, first with Eastern Airlines, because of its prominent routes to Florida, and later the entire industry. By 1972 the FAA ordered more stringent screening of passengers and allowed the airlines to refuse to carry any suspicious-looking person who refused a physical search. Finally, on January 5, 1973, all U.S. airports were required by the FAA to screen passengers and their carry-on baggage electronically.

These efforts made a significant difference as the rate of hijacking decreased. They also raised more troublesome issues of privacy and the constitutionality of these measures. Of particular concern was the use of the magnetometers to conduct, in effect, a warrantless search.¹³ But not for the first time nor the last, the American public was willing to surrender rights for increased security during troubled times. The effects of these decisions are still with us.

The most effective measure to stop these casual hijackings required a highly unusual step. Although neither country had diplomatic relations with the other, an agreement was reached between the United States and Cuba on the treatment of

hijackers. Working through the Swiss embassy, the U.S. hammered out a deal with Cuba through the good offices of the Czechoslovakian embassy to return the perpetrator of a hijacking back to the country of the origin of the flight or try them as criminals. The only exception was for political refugees as long as no one was injured during the escape attempt.¹⁴ Thus, with a stroke of a pen, Cuba no longer was a desirable destination for the casual hijacker.

During the 1960s a more disturbing trend in hijacking appeared - that of the professional, motivated by political or religious ideology and dedicated to achieving his or her goals at almost any cost. These individuals carefully planned their hijacking attempts in order to draw public attention to their cause and directly influence the foreign policy of other nations or political actors. The hijackers were not trying to escape or extort money; they were making dramatic, visible statements in support of their causes. Passengers and crew were held hostage in return for the release of imprisoned compatriots or other goals. The aircraft were frequently flown to sympathetic countries where the local government would overtly or covertly cooperate. With no international agreements addressing the problem of air piracy and no treaties government the extradition of the perpetrators of these crimes, political hijackers found a

way to hijack international flights and often escape prosecution and punishment.

Through the 1960s and into the 1970s, the goal was to create drama. While deaths did occur, murder was incidental and not the objective. To this end aircraft were hijacked from prominent airlines and from prominent airports, demonstrating the power of the hijackers and the impotence of the authorities to stop them. On several occasions the crisis ended with the storming of the aircraft by security personnel with casualties on both sides. Quite often the airliners became the actual target and were blown up at the end of the crisis once the hostages were released and a settlement reached. The sight of exploding, burning airliners certainly made the news and forced the public to pay attention to their cause.

The first recorded political hijacking took place in Peru on February 21, 1931. A Panagra Ford Tri-Motor was blocked from taking off from Arequipa by armed soldiers who sought to commandeer the aircraft to support an attempted coup. Courageously, the pilot refused for almost 10 days; in that time the coup had succeeded and he was freed to go.¹⁵ Little else happened for years except for the previously mentioned escaping political refugees.

This began to change in the late 1960s. Following the overwhelming victory of Israel in the Six-Day War and its

occupation of the Sinai, West Bank, and Golan Heights, the epicenter of international political conflict shifted to the Middle East. Seeking to draw attention to the cause of their people, Palestinian terrorists - or freedom fighters, depending upon who is defining the term - conducted a series of dramatic hijackings against Israeli, European, and U.S. airlines.

Hijackings were now no longer just an American phenomenon but a serious international problem. While security measures began to work, particularly in the U.S., the affected nations and the airline industry realized that no international legal measures existed to combat this threat.

In 1963, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the first effective steps were taken during a meeting in Tokyo. The "Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed Onboard Aircraft" charged its signatories to take all measures necessary to "restore control of an aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft," "permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as possible," and "to return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession."¹⁶ Ratified finally in 1969, these measures were generally effective. On only three occasions were the passengers delayed in returning home. In one case in August 1969, Syrian official allowed all the passengers of a hijacked

TWA airliner to return except for two Israeli citizens, who were held in exchange for 13 Syrian commandos held by Israel. The previous summer, Arab hijackers seized an El Al airliner and flew it to Algiers. Algeria was a vocal opponent of Israel and kept the 22 Israeli passengers and the crew after letting the non-Israelis leave. Strong protests followed, but it took the threat of a boycott of Algeria by the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations to force Algeria to abide by the Tokyo Convention and release everyone.¹⁷

The turning point in this form of hijacking occurred in the summer of 1970. On September 6, 1970 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attempted to hijack four airliners in a dramatic terrorist attack. The El Al hijacking was thwarted by armed guards and violent maneuvering by the pilot which enabled the passengers and an armed guard to overpower the attackers. Three other aircraft were successfully taken: a Pan Am 747 was flown to Egypt, where the hijackers were seized, but a Swissair and BOAC airliner were commandeered to Dawson Field in Jordan, soon to be known as Revolution Field. After international outrage and 24 days of negotiations, the 400 hostages were freed in exchange for seven Palestinian prisoners. The Swissair and BOAC airliners were blown up.¹⁸

The International community finally realized that hijacking was a global threat and began to implement security measures at

all international airports. More importantly, they realized that the Tokyo protocols lacked deterrence. In the Fall of 1970, the ICAO Legal Committee submitted a draft convention to a diplomatic conference meeting in The Hague. The result was the "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft," also known as The Hague Convention. Fifty nations signed the charter including the Soviet Union and its clients for the U.S.S.R had been subject to a rash of politically motivated hijackings as well.¹⁹ The Hague Convention tightened the law and prohibited most countries from being used as potential safe harbors. Of greatest significance, for the first time, nations agreed to extradite all hijackers promptly. By this time, even the most extreme government realized that openly supporting such terrorist activities served no purpose in the face of international condemnation and the threat of sanctions. Thus, hijacking was now considered an international crime and all countries obligated to treat the hijackers as criminals.

Nations now had the legal means to enforce and deter hijacking and, combined with ever more effective screening and security, hijackings and air piracy became less frequent. They did not end, however; only the terror morphed into a new form. While hijackings continued at a steady pace of about one per year, most dramatically with the 1976 hijacking of an Air France

airline to Entebbe, Uganda, and the subsequent dramatic rescue of the flight by Israeli commandos, a new threat emerged.²⁰

Harking back to the destruction of that Boeing 247 in 1933, the new target was no longer a single individual but the aircraft itself, and all of its innocent passengers. The airliner - a peaceful symbol prosperity and commerce - was now a tool of terror and death itself.

Hijacking attempts markedly decreased in the succeeding years as increased airport security made it more difficult for a hijacker to smuggle weapons on board in order to seize the aircraft.²¹ To counter these strategies, terrorists changed tactics. Instead of hijacking, the terror act of choice soon became inflight bombing. Smuggling a bomb on board meant the perpetrators were less likely to get caught. The terrorist was now invisible which generated more fear - the goal of terrorism. Terrorist groups acting independently or in concert with rogue governments, placed bombs on airliners through shipped cargo or luggage carried on board by unsuspecting accomplices.

On June 22, 1985, an unknown man was able to convince a ticket agent in Vancouver, Canada, to check his bag through to Bombay even though his ticket was unconfirmed. A fatal mistake. On June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182 from Montreal to Delhi via London exploded in mid air over Irish airspace, crashing into the Atlantic. All 329 people on board the Boeing 747 died,

including 268 Canadians, most of whom were of Indian ancestry. The lengthy 20 year investigation revealed that the attack had been conducted by Sikh extremists who wished to retaliate against the Indian government for the attack on the Golden Temple the previous year. Tensions were extremely high between the Indian government and the Sikh community resulting in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984. Anti-Sikh rioting killed thousands. The Sikh extremists had hoped to destroy two aircraft, but the plot to destroy a 747 at Narita Airport was uncovered when the bomb exploded prematurely killing two Japanese baggage handlers before the aircraft took off.

The most notorious bombing of this era occurred over Scotland with the destruction of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 by agents of the rogue state of Libya. The mercurial dictator of Libya, Muammar Kaddafi, had been trading blows with the United States over a number of issues, particularly the control of the Gulf of Sidra. Several incidents in the Gulf led Kaddafi to bomb a West Berlin nightclub frequented by U.S. servicemen. In relation, the U.S. government conducted air strikes against the Libyan capital Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986.

By December, intelligence had reached the United States that an airliner bombing was planned by Middle Eastern

terrorists by the end of the year who sought to hide a bomb in the luggage of an unsuspecting European woman. Several terrorist organizations later called to take credit. Security was increased but a gap was exploited in Frankfurt where the luggage containing the bomb was loaded on a connecting flight to London to be transferred to Flight 103 to New York and Detroit.

At 6:25 in the evening, Pan Am 103 departed Heathrow and climbed quickly to 31,000 feet. Thirty-seven minutes later, contact was lost and air traffic control radar recorded five blips rather than one. Immediately a British Airways pilot reported a massive fire on the ground near Lockerbie, Scotland. All 243 passengers and 16 crew members were killed. Sadly eleven people on the ground perished as well. Americans accounted for 189 of the dead the worst act of terror against the U.S. to date.

A meticulous three year-long investigation revealed the culprits were two Libyan government agents. Eventually, Libya admitted culpability and paid compensation to the victims, though no amount of money could ever compensate for their losses.

During this period, many other attempts were made but most were foiled. Unfortunately, in a prelude of things to come, a new form of aerial terrorism revealed itself. Prior to the 1990s, hijackers either commandeered aircraft by force or placed

bombs in them. Regardless of their methodology, their intent was to wreak havoc but not get caught, or at least have an exit strategy if they were apprehended. All this changed in 1994.

On Christmas Eve, 1994, Air France Flight 8969, an Airbus A300, was seized at gunpoint by four members of the Armed Islamic group in Algiers, Algeria. Algeria was in a state of civil war with Islamic extremists at that time. The hijackers, posing as security guards, quickly seized the aircraft and placed explosives throughout the cabin. Immediately, Algerian security surrounded the aircraft and hours of tense negotiations began. The talks did not go well. The terrorists demanded the release of imprisoned compatriots while the authorities refused. As tensions mounted, the hijackers began to kill hostages. Three died before Algeria agreed to let the aircraft leave for Paris, the flight's original destination. In the meantime, French authorities learned that the terrorists' real objective was to make a political statement by destroying the Eiffel Tower with the airliner as a flying bomb.

Armed with this knowledge, the French mobilized a special unit of the Gendarmerie National to train to assault the aircraft and free the hostages.

In the meantime, the aircraft took-off for Marseille, ostensibly to refuel. Upon landing, the hijackers demanded the aircraft be completely fueled with far more kerosene than was

needed to fly to Paris - clearly the objective was indeed to create a massive firebomb. That did not happen. On December 26, the gendarmes stormed the aircraft in a brilliant rescue operation, killing all four hijackers and freeing all of the remaining passengers and crew.²²

This was the first act in the next stage of aerial piracy - that of suicide terrorism. This new tactic throws out all civilized conventions as it was always assumed that the hijackers, while taking huge risks, did not wish to die. This now changed. It is very difficult to stop a murderer who is willing to sacrifice his life.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, America was left standing as the sole superpower. Basking in the glow of victory in the Cold War, according to Richard K. Betts, America "confused primacy with invulnerability."²³ Rightly or wrongly, this made the U.S. a ready target for many disaffected people's fears and anxieties. U.S. power was preeminent and seen as the root cause of their real and imagined problems.²⁴ Striking back at this oppressor became a legitimate enterprise in their minds. The fact that killing civilians and committing suicide is proscribed by all of the major religions was rationalized away. In their mind, they were at war and, in the age of mutually assured destruction by thermonuclear weapons, civilians and cities were a legitimate target.²⁵ Attacking a superpower is

dangerous and impossible using conventional methods. Resourceful and motivated terrorists developed asymmetrical tactics, once again using airliners, this time as the weapon. With America's security apparatus focused on conventional threats, and its domestic police often competing for resources, this left the door open to unconventional attacks.

Suicide attacks - or kamikaze hijacking as Betts calls it - succeed by using the very tools of western power and progress against their creators. This was seen clearly on the morning of September 11, 2001, when 19 determined terrorists hijacked four airliners, destroying the World Trade Center in New York and damaging the Pentagon in Washington. Their brazen attack took over 3,000 lives, including their own. Betts said it best:

Kamikaze hijacking also reflects an impressive capacity for strategic judo, the turning of the West's strength against itself. The flip-side of a primacy that diffuses its power throughout the world is that advanced elements of that power become more accessible to its enemies. Nineteen men from technological backwards societies ... used computers and modern financial procedures with facility, and they forcibly appropriated the aviation technology of the West and used it as a weapon. They not only rebelled against the soft power of the United States, they trumped it by hijacking the country's hard power."²⁶

They also used the characteristics of a free society that respects privacy and freedom of movement to avoid detection.

Such attacks are extremely costly to prevent but relatively inexpensive to conduct. Since 9/11, there have been no similar successful attacks, although many attempts have been made, such

as shoe bomber Richard Reid's attempt to destroy an American Airlines flight in December 2001, the plot to destroy 10 transatlantic airliners with liquid explosives in 2006, and the Christmas 2009 attempt to detonate explosive underwear worn by a young Nigerian on a Northwest Airlines A330. All were thwarted, at least for the time being. Ironically, when the terrorists escalated the threat, passengers have now become increasingly willing to participate in their own defense. The hijackers of United Flight 93, the fourth hijacked airliner of 9/11, failed because the passengers fought to retake control of the aircraft and their fate. The shoe bomber and underwear bombers were detected and subdued by alert passengers. Indeed, the likelihood of an attack exactly like 9/11 has been greatly reduced simply by changing the rules of engagement. The locked armored cockpit doors are now not to be opened under any circumstance because it is assumed that potential hijackers are intent on suicide and many pilots are now armed.

The extreme cost cannot be measured in dollars alone. While the 9/11 attacks hurt the U.S. economy, it was only a temporary wound. One of many unintended consequences of crimes against civil aviation has been the reaction of the U.S. government in the passage of strict security measures, particularly those of the so-called "Patriot Act," that raised serious constitutional questions about sacrificing liberties for

the sake of security. The fallout from this is still occurring. Hopefully, America will return to a satisfactory balance that provides security while functioning within its constitutional restraints. History shows that this has been America's course. As the threat of terrorism, particularly from the sky, is better understood, perhaps this will be the case once again.

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⁴ David Gero, Flights of Terror: Aerial Hijack and Sabotage Since 1930 (Sparkford, England: Haynes Publishing, 2009, p. 85.

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¹¹ Stephen, p. 433.

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- ²⁵ Ibid. p. 25.
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